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This paper surveys the economic literature on simple policy rules and analyzes 
econometric methods used to estimate them, emphasizing effects of model misspecification. 
We draw attention to inconsistencies in evaluation of the rules and implications for policy 
advice, which is commonly done based on benchmark rules that could be improperly estimated, 
or selected for a wrong reason.  
We simulate a simple macroeconomic model with an interest rate obtained from a 
simple policy reaction function similar to Taylor (1993). We estimate different versions of the 
simple policy rule, using the simulated data. Estimations document illusionary presence of 
extra variables, such as lagged interest rate, output gap growth, and inflation differential; or 
claim the policy function to be forward looking. Length of the sample or ignorance of real time 
data errors do not seem to have significant impact on the results. 
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1. Introduction 
In recent years, evaluation of simple policy rules has become one of the most common 
exercises in the economic literature, especially since the publication of John Taylor’s paper in 
1993.
1 Taylor demonstrated that a simple reaction function, later known as a Taylor rule, with a 
policy instrument (a short-term interest rate) responding to movements in fundamental 
variables (inflation and output gap), follows closely the observed path of the Federal Funds 
Rate in the U.S. in the late 80s and early 90s. 
The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the research on policy rules and, more 
importantly, on their use as a basis for policy recommendations. As Blinder (1997) notes: 
“having looked at monetary policy from both sides now, I can testify that central banking in 
practice is as much art as science. Nonetheless, while practicing this dark art, I have always 
found the science quite useful.” 
First, our paper seems to be the first one in the literature that surveys the economic 
literature on simple policy rules, how they have been used, and most importantly, how they can 
be potentially misused. We do this by discussing the original Taylor rule and its modifications, 
and then documenting its uses in theoretical and empirical papers, as well as its possible 
abuses. These abuses consist of policy advice based on the benchmark rules either selected for 
wrong reasons or incorrectly estimated.  
This paper does not represent a criticism to the simple policy rules literature, but rather 
it draws attention to inconsistencies in their evaluation, and to how one formulates policy 
                                                 
1 A search in the EconLit database for the keyword “monetary policy rules” for 2000-2003 
returns 361 published articles, or an average of ninety per year. Taking into account various 
working papers and ongoing projects, like ours, is likely to at least double this number.    - 4 - 
advice. The potential shortcomings of the simple policy rules, have already been documented in 
disparate papers in the in theoretical and empirical literature. 
The second contribution of our paper is testing the econometrical techniques used to 
estimate the policy rules. Studies that estimate the monetary policy in the US in the last two 
decades suggest very different interpretations of the same policy making process and all 
propose plausible stories, supported by econometric indications of a good fit, various historical 
evidence, and quotes from policy makers speeches. Some add lagged interest rate to a list of 
monitored fundamentals, some not; some base policy rule on expectations rather than observed 
values; and some use real-time rather than ex post estimates of fundamentals.  
This simple fact has led us to question some of the methods used in this line of research, 
as well as some policy recommendations based on rules estimated with these methods. We do a 
Monte-Carlo exercise, simulating a simple macroeconomic model where there is no uncertainty 
related to monetary policy setting, and monetary policy is assumed to be conducted according 
to a very specific and simple rule. Obtained data from simulations, for inflation, output gap and 
interest rate are used later to estimate monetary policy setting (short term interest rates) by 
using ordinary least squares and generalized method of moments. 
The evaluation of monetary policy reaction functions is very much like a search for a 
black cat in a dark room, not knowing whether it is there for sure.
2 In our paper, we look for a 
                                                 
2 In fact, Alan Greenspan, the Federal Reserve Board chairman, mentioned in many occasions 
that simple formal rules are inadequate as either descriptions or prescriptions for policy at 
crucial points, like those in recent US policy history. These remarks were made most recently 
at the American Economic Association (AEA) meetings, in January 2004, and at a recent 
symposium sponsored by the Kansas City Federal Reserve Bank, at Jackson Hole, August 
2003.     - 5 - 
cat in a bright lit room, and yet as our results suggest, we cannot distinguish it from a dog or an 
elephant! 
In our simulations we use a very specific Taylor rule, based solely on lagged values of 
output gap and inflation. However, our estimates suggest that the monetary policy setting could 
be characterized by a forward looking rule or by a rule with other variables present in it (such 
as lagged interest rate, output gap growth, inflation differential). Assuming the presence of the 
real time error or using shorter sample it does not change much these outcomes. Both OLS and 
GMM estimations produce rather similar results. Thus, our exercise suggests that the methods 
commonly used by the researchers, are not a sufficiently good equipment, if the model is mis-
specified.  
Overall, we argue that there may be “too big” conclusions drawn based on “too little” 
evidence, if the estimation of the simple policy reaction functions is not thorough enough. As 
monetary policy rules are widely used these days to gauge policy makers,
3 improper 
recommendations made on their basis could be harmful. Thus, it becomes very important to 
ensure the awareness of the drawbacks of the estimation of such rules and how much judgment 
is necessary for policy advice, even when employing sound techniques and widely used 
models. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 surveys the uses and abuses of the Taylor 
rule; section 3 describes our simulations and results; and section 4 concludes. 
 
                                                 
3 The Economist commonly uses Taylor rule prescriptions when describing the stance of 
monetary policy in U.S. and Euroland. Monetary Trends published by the St Louis Federal 
Reserve Bank regularly reports on Taylor rule components.    - 6 - 
2. Taylor Rules: Uses And Abuses 
This section surveys the uses of monetary policy rules, in particular Taylor rules for 
closed economies, as well as their potential abuses. Most of the literature referenced here 
applies to analysis of the monetary policy in the United States, being by far the most studied 
monetary policy decision process. However, the conclusions of this paper apply to other 
countries as well, and especially to less developed countries. In those cases policy advice 
should be even more judgment based, since the empirical literature could be much more scarce, 
and the potential for having a misspecified model could be larger, given major structural breaks 
and common “stop and go” policies. 
 
The Taylor Rule and its Modifications 
A monetary policy rule expresses the central bank instrument, a short term interest rate, 
as an explicit function of information available to the central bank. Most of the literature 
focuses on simple rules, where the instrument is a function of a small subset of the information.  
The best known simple instrument rule is the Taylor rule, where the instrument rate 
responds only to inflation and output gap. Taylor (1993) suggested a simple rule that could 
explain the monetary policy setting for the early years of Alan Greenspan’s chairmanship, 
1987-1992. If one looks at the actual federal funds rate path and the path from the suggested 
rule, s/he would find two series to be very close. Since the rule described a complicated process 
in very simple terms, it became very popular very fast.
4 
                                                 
4 “By writing his rule in terms of the instrument actually used by central banks and expressing 
his formula with brilliant simplicity, Taylor made the concept of a monetary rule more 
palatable to central bankers-especially as he showed that recent US experience had in fact 
conformed to his formula rather closely.” McCallum (1999b).    - 7 - 
One could derive versions of Taylor rules as a solution to an optimization problem, 
where policy makers are minimizing a loss function expressed in terms of weighted average of 
inflation and output gap variances (Woodford, 2001). “The Taylor rule incorporates several 
features of an optimal monetary policy, from the standpoint of at least one simple class of 
optimizing models. The response that it prescribes to fluctuations in inflation or the output gap 
tends to stabilize those variables, and stabilization of both variables is an appropriate goal, at 
least when the output gap is properly defined.” 
Such rules are also widely referred to in literature as policy reaction functions, where 
policy makers change an instrument (in this particular case, a short term nominal interest rate) 
whenever there are changes in certain economic fundamentals. Mostly the short term interest 
rate is a function of inflation and output gap, since these are the main variables policymakers 
would like to influence by changing the instrument, and these variables have been assigned to 
them to target, explicitly, or implicitly. 
To understand the uses and abuses of Taylor rules we start by describing the original 
Taylor rule (1993) and presenting the modifications it suffered since then. 
 The Taylor rule (1993) is defined as: 
*( * ) ( 1 ) tt t y t t y t ir C C yC C C y ππ ππ π π =+ + − + = + + +  
where it is the instrument rate in period t, r* is the real interest rate target, πt - π* is the 
“inflation gap,” a difference between actual inflation πt and inflation target π*, yt = logYt – 
logYt* is the output gap, where Yt is real GDP and Yt* is potential output,
5 and the coefficients 
                                                 
5 Taylor (1993) identified potential output empirically with a linear trend, while other papers 
use quadratic, Hodrick-Prescott trends, or other more sophisticated techniques.    - 8 - 
Cπ and Cy are positive. In original Taylor (1993) formulation Cπ and Cy were both 0.5, the 
inflation and real interest rate targets were 2%, and hence the constant C was equal to 1. 
The original Taylor rule has suffered various modifications as researchers were trying to 
make it more realistic or appropriate. We document some of these modifications as well as 
theoretical explanations for those modifications, and the most influential papers in the 
literature. We limit the presentation to the modifications of the original Taylor rule for closed 
economies, and those that are not based on asset prices, since these are the ones most 
commonly used. The final conclusions of the paper, however, are expected to apply to all types 
of simple monetary policy rules. 
(i) One modification to the original rule was to incorporate forward looking behavior in 
order to avoid seeming short-sightedness of policy makers. Central banks are obviously taking 
into consideration a broader array of information when setting the short term interest rates, 
including inflation and output expectations, as noted by Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1998). 
Meanwhile the public is forming its own rational expectations for the same variables. Romer 
and Romer (2001) show that central banks have an information advantage, due to vast 
resources allocated to forecasting. Therefore, most papers estimate the short term interest rate 
mainly as a function of central bank expectations of output and inflation. The central bank 
expectations considered are either formed within a model, as in Clarida, Gali and Gertler 
(1998), or actual estimates of the central bank in real time, as done by Orphanides (2001).
6  
(ii) An alternative modification to the original rule was to introduce lags of inflation and 
output gap replacing the contemporaneous variables. The literature has reached the consensus 
                                                 
6 Short term interest rate as a function of inflation expectations contained in the bond rates, has 
been estimated by Mehra (1999).     - 9 - 
that it is not possible to know the actual output gap and inflation at the time of setting the 
interest rate. Using lags rather than contemporaneous values of the information variables 
ensures more realistic timing (McCallum, 1999). While the rule starts to seem somewhat 
backward looking, because it uses lags rather than leads, that is not the case, since lags in such 
a setting merely serve as indicators of the future values. Thus, even though the rule could be lag 
based, it would not necessarily be backward looking. 
(iii) Interest rate smoothing behavior is a commonly used modification of the Taylor 
rule. Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999) note that although the necessity of including an interest 
rate smoothing term is not proved theoretically yet, it seems rather intuitive to economists to 
use it for several reasons. One reason is model uncertainty. Ideally one would like to take into 
account that the central bank is continually learning about the economy as it adjusts its policy, 
but this is not easily applicable with the current knowledge. Therefore, it is recommended to 
exercise caution in policy prescriptions, and the central bank is modeled as more cautionary, 
smoothing the interest rate, as demonstrated by Brainard (1967). A second reason could be that 
in contrast to the case of certainty equivalence, policy actions affect the conditional variance of 
inflation and output, as well as the conditional mean, therefore it could motivate a smoother 
path of interest rate than the certainty equivalent policy would imply. Other possible reasons 
for incorporating interest rate smoothing behavior mentioned by Clarida, Gali and Gertler 
(1998) are fear of disrupting capital markets, loss of credibility from sudden large policy 
reversal, the need for consensus building for a policy change and the exploitation of the central 
bank of the dependency of demand on expected future interest rates, etc.
7  
                                                 
7 Woodford (2002) shows that in the context of a simple model of optimizing private-sector 
behavior, the assignment of an interest-rate smoothing objective to the central bank may be 
(continued)    - 10 - 
(iv) Being as simple as it is, the Taylor rule cannot possibly take into account all the 
factors affecting the economy. Policy makers are known to react not only to movements in the 
output gap and inflation but also to movements in exchange rate, stock market, possibly 
political developments, etc (Kozicki, 1999; Tchaidze, 2004). The way to capture this issue 
would be to introduce a new variable, a so-called policy shock term, reflecting a judgmental 
element of the policy making process. 
 (v) Some authors suggested the use of unemployment gap as opposed to output gap, to 
improve the fit of the data, as suggested by Taylor (1999) and Oprhanides and Williams (2002). 
This modification reflects Okun’s law (1962), which links output gap and unemployment gap. 
These type of rules tend to perform quite well in terms of stabilizing economic fluctuations, at 
least when natural rates of interest and unemployment are accurately measured. 
(vi) Finally, the last suggested modification was to use rates of growth of 
unemployment, or output, to account for measurement errors in the real-time estimates of the 
natural rate of output, as suggested by McCallum (2001), Orphanides (2000), Orphanides and 
Williams (2002).  
 
Uses of Taylor Rules 
Taylor rules have been used in theoretical and empirical papers, from descriptive and 
prescriptive points of view. 
                                                                                                                                                           
desirable, even when reduction of the magnitude of interest-rate changes is not a social 
objective in itself.    - 11 - 
The focus of research in theoretical papers is on whether simple rules solve the time 
inconsistency bias (McCallum, 1997);
8 if they are optimal (McCallum, 1999, Svensson, 2003, 
Woodford, 2001, etc.); and on how they perform in different macroeconomic models (Taylor, 
1999).
9 
Descriptive papers include analysis of various specifications and estimations of Taylor 
rules (Clarida, Gali and Gertler, 1999, Kozicki, 1999, Judd and Rudebusch 1998, etc.). These 
studies examine particular historical episodes and address two questions: to what extent simple 
instrument rules are good empirical descriptions of central bank behavior; and what the average 
response of the policy instrument to movements in various fundamentals is.
10 
Prescriptive papers suggest what interest rate should be (McCallum, 1999, Bryant, 
Hooper and Mann, 1993, Taylor, 1999), or how it should be set up. Commonly, suggestions are 
                                                 
8 Monetary policy literature of the past three decades has focused on finding solutions for inflation 
bias, or time inconsistent policies. Inflation bias arises, since there is a short-run benefit from 
surprise inflation, when different distortions are present in the economy. The solution for the first 
best equilibrium would be to remove these distortions. However, this solution has not been found, 
as long as the society is normally concerned with the distribution of its income. Therefore other 
solutions have been considered. The second best equilibrium is the commitment of the central bank 
(monetary authority) to a monetary policy rule. 
9 By stabilizing inflation around inflation target without causing unnecessary output-gap 
variability. 
10 The two questions get commonly mixed, though they are somewhat independent from each 
other. If monetary policy is conducted via a Taylor rule, then estimating it would naturally provide 
an answer to the second question as well. However, one may still estimate the average response of 
the interest rate to the movements in fundamentals even if the manner of the monetary policy 
conduct is different (e.g. by targeting exchange rate or money supply). Thus, the properly 
formulated question would be: given the way the monetary authorities are operating, what is the 
consequential response of the interest rate to movements in inflation and output gap? One reason to 
ask such a question is to see whether the response of interest rate to inflation is greater or less than 
1, a condition which many researchers have pointed out as a necessary one for inflation stabilizing 
policy making (Taylor, 1999).    - 12 - 
based on the rules that are either outcome of theoretical papers or the result of estimating 
“good/successful” periods of monetary policy. 
 
Abuses of Taylor Rules 
The potential abuses in policy prescription papers are mainly related to the choice of the 
benchmark rules, whether based on theoretical or empirical papers. In the two following 
subsections, we document and provide a brief description of the problems that might arise 
when choosing such rules. 
 
Theoretical Choice of a Benchmark Rule 
Policy advice based on rules from theoretical models comes from rules simulated or 
derived in a model or class of models considered representative for the economy. There are 
potential problems as documented in literature and surveyed below. 
First, Svensson (2003) and Woodford (2001) warn that commitment to simple rules 
may not always be optimal, a fact that should be taken into account when giving policy 
advice.
11 
Second, simple policy rules may not be robust across different models. Due to 
uncertainty about the true model of the economy and/or about potential output levels, the most 
recent theoretical efforts have concentrated on suggesting a set of robust simple rules, that 
                                                 
11 As Svensson (2003) notes “Monetary policy by the world’s more advanced central banks 
these days is at least as optimizing and forward-looking as the behavior of the most rational 
private agents. I find it strange that a large part of the literature on monetary policy still prefers 
to represent central bank behavior with the help of mechanical instrument rules.”    - 13 - 
could be uses as a basis for policy advice, as in Giannoni and Woodford (2003a, 2003b), 
Svensson and Woodford (2004), Walsh (2003b), etc. 
Third, several recent papers show that when the central bank follows Taylor type rules 
in sticky-price models of the type that fit well the US data, the price level may not be 
determined and there could be several paths for the instrument and multiple equilibria, all 
coming from the same model with the same rule (Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe, 2001, 
Carlstrom and Fuerst, 2001, etc.) 
Fourth, how should policy makers respond to the presence of the measurement errors is 
a question, to which no firm answer has been given yet. While some researchers advocate a 
more cautious approach, with lower response coefficients (Orphanides 2001), others advocated 
a more aggressive approach (i.e. with higher coefficients) to policy making (Onatski and Stock, 
2002). Finally, some studies have argued in favor of “certainty equivalence,” which implies no 
changes in policy makers behavior and response coefficients (Swansson, 2004).
12  
Fifth, most theoretical papers talk about inflation in rather generic terms. Thus, when it 
comes to policy prescriptions, it is not clear what particular measure should be used – CPI, core 
CPI, CPI less food and energy, GDP deflator, etc. Even when a particular index is chosen, there 
are more choices to make – annual or quarterly; if annual, then whether average of quarterly 
numbers or a growth rate over the 4 quarters; growth being calculated as a log-difference or a 
ratio, etc. Even though the differences between these various calculations could be minimal in a 
case of low and stable inflation, one should be aware of these caveats. 
                                                 
12 “A standard result in the literature on monetary policy rules is that of certainty equivalence: 
given the expected values of all the state variables of the economy, policy should be set in a 
way that is independent of all higher moments of those variables.”    - 14 - 
Sixth, any formula based recommendation is bound to be ignoring a judgmental 
element, which reflects policymakers account of other developments, not reflected in output 
gap or inflation behavior.
13 
 
Empirical Choice of a Benchmark Rule 
Policy advice based on rules from empirical papers comes, usually, from estimating a 
period which is considered “good” or “successful” in combating inflation or in promoting 
output growth or both. There are several problems with such an approach as well. 
To start with, Rogoff (2003) notes that it is not clear how much credit do policy makers 
deserve for such exceptionally good performance of many economies in the last fifteen or so 
years. He notes that the achievement of price stability globally may be due not only to good 
policy making but also to favorable macroeconomic environment. The main cause spelled out 
is globalization, which through increased competition has put a downward pressure on prices.  
Moreover, Stock and Watson (2003) also argue that the improvements in the conduct of 
monetary policy after 1979 are only partially responsible for the reduction of the variance of 
output during business cycle fluctuations. This could have been caused by “improved ability of 
individuals and firms to smooth shocks because of innovation and deregulation in financial 
markets.” They also note that during this period macroeconomic shocks were “unusually 
quiescent.” 
                                                 
13 See discussion on page 10.    - 15 - 
Therefore, estimating policy rules based on the last decade or two may give an 
impression of a good monetary policy which should be maintained in the future, while it may 
not necessarily be the case. 
Second, can one really impose the implied response coefficients and targets from one 
economic or policy regime to another, without accounting for changes in the structure of the 
economy, when making policy prescriptions? Greenspan (2004) particularly warned about this 
abuse, on several occasions, the last one being in January 2004 in his AEA speech: “such rules 
suffer from much of the same fixed-coefficient difficulties we have with our large-scale 
models.”  
Alternatively, even though there may be no changes in the economy, there may be 
changes in the attitude of policy makers. Such changes could be reflected in different targets for 
real interest rate or inflation (which in terms of Taylor rules translate into a different constant), 
or there may be a change in the weights policy makers assign to inflation variance versus 
output gap variance (which in terms of Taylor rules translates into different inflation and output 
gap response coefficients).  
Therefore considerable uncertainty surrounds monetary policy decisions,
14 and one 
should exercise caution when using reaction functions estimated on a changing structure of the 
economy to make policy recommendation for future paths of the interest rate. 
Third, the coefficients might not be estimated with a very high degree of preciseness 
and standard errors could be quite large. Once the size of confidence intervals is taken into 
                                                 
14 Walsh (2003a).    - 16 - 
account, the policy recommendations on how the instrument should be set could become rather 
blurred. 
Again, like mentioned on page 14, any formula based recommendation is bound to be 
ignoring a judgmental element, which is an important factor behind policy decisions. 
Finally and most importantly, can we actually properly estimate the rules? The answer 
is “not really,” not with the methods commonly used nowadays, unless one is very careful, as 
the next section documents this issue in more details.  
 
Estimating Taylor Rules 
 
The rules are estimated using either OLS or instrumental variables, if they are backward 
looking (see Orphanides 2001), or GMM if they are forward looking (see Clarida, Gali, Gertler 
2000) and it is not obvious that the following econometrical problems are addressed properly, 
or always. 
1. The very first problem is that even if one finds empirically a Taylor rule, it does not 
mean the monetary policy is conducted in such a way. The empirical relationship found may be 
a reflection of something else – a long term relationship between nominal interest rate, inflation 
and output gap,
15 or a reflection of a completely different kind of monetary policy.
16 
                                                 
15 As the definition of the rule (see page 7) shows, one may view the Taylor rule as an 
equilibrium relationship between the three variables (also known as a Fisher equation  
i = r + π), which shows that  
a) in equilibrium, the nominal interest rate equals real interest rate plus inflation;  
b) an increase in the equilibrium inflation or real interest rate results in an exact increase in the 
nominal interest rate;  
c) positive deviations of output or inflation from equilibrium result in higher nominal interest 
rate. 
    - 17 - 
Svensson and Woodford (2003) note: “Any policy rule implies a “reaction function,” 
that specifies the central bank’s instrument as a function of predetermined endogenous or 
exogenous variables observable to the central bank at the time that it sets the instrument. They 
also warned that this “implied reaction function” should not, in general, be confused with the 
policy rule itself.” (See footnote 10.) 
2. The most obvious econometrical question is how to deal with a high serial correlation 
of the variables. The common recipe is to estimate the rules with OLS or GMM, using Newey-
West standard errors and serial correlation robust estimators in order to account for 
heteroskedasticity, and instrumental variables, for the forward looking rules. What is worth 
noting, however, is that while papers estimating Taylor rules commonly treat interest rates as 
stationary series, most term structure and money demand papers treat interest rates of various 
maturity as I(1) series,
17 which would call for different econometrical techniques. 
3. Are the estimates from simple rules reliable, and are they robust to difference in 
assumptions or estimators? Jondeau and others (2003) show that over the baseline period 1979-
2000 alternative estimates of the Federal Reserve reaction function using several GMM 
                                                                                                                                                           
16 Minford et al, 2002 demonstrate that a Friedman type money supply policy rule is 
mathematically non-distinguishable from a Taylor rule. 
17 King and Kurmann (2002) analyzed the term structure of the US interest rates and Baba, 
Hendry and Starr (1992) analyzed the US money demand. Both strands of literature found that 
US interest rates are stationary in first differences, therefore non stationary in levels, I(1) series. 
However, Mehra (1993) finds in money demand studies that US interest rates are stationary 
series. Moreover, Clardia, Gali and Gertler (2000) note that they treat interest rates as 
stationary series, “an assumption that we view as reasonable for the postwar US, even though 
the null of a unit root in either variables is often hard to reject at conventional significance 
levels in small samples like ours, given the persistence of both series and the well known low 
power of unit root tests.”    - 18 - 
estimators
18 and a maximum likelihood estimator yield substantially different parameter 
estimates. Estimation results may also not be robust with respect to sample, to different set of 
instrumental variables or order of lags. The explanation for the discrepancy in estimators could 
be a mis-specification of the model or of the moment conditions. As it turns out in this 
particular case, the mis-specification was caused by a shift in the reaction function parameters, 
somewhere around 1987:Q3, when there was a change in chairmanship at the Federal Reserve 
Board.  
4. Like in any other empirical papers, making policy recommendations based on rules 
estimated from a short sample is incorrect, therefore not advised. This problems applies 
especially to countries that have a short period of stable data.  
5. Alternative use of long samples often ignores the possibility of changes in parameters 
of the rule—be those response coefficients or real interest rate or inflation targets. For example, 
one should make a distinction between the monetary regime of the Fed during Paul Volcker’s 
chairmanship and the Fed during Greenspan’s chairmanship. While in both periods Fed was 
committed to price stability, it is doubtful that inflation targets were the same. In fact, one may 
wonder if the Fed had a constant inflation target during Paul Volcker’s chairmanship. (See 
Tchaidze, 2004, and point 2 above).
19 
6. A rather important, but still commonly overlooked caveat has been pointed out by 
Orphanides (2001). He finds that real time policy recommendations differ considerably from 
those obtained with ex post revised data and that estimated policy reaction functions based on 
                                                 
18 Two-step, iterative and continuous-updating. 
19 See also Schwartz (2003) for a comment on Orphanides (2003) paper which estimates Taylor 
rules for the entire Fed history.    - 19 - 
ex post revised data provide misleading descriptions of historical policy and obscure the 
behavior suggested by information available to the Federal Reserve in real time.  
7. Among the estimation problems that one encounters, which have very important 
bearing on policy prescriptions, is the illusionary effect of monetary policy inertia, documented 
by Rudebusch (2002b). He shows that “a standard policy rule with slow partial adjustment and 
no serial correlation in the errors will be difficult to distinguish empirically from a policy rule 
that has immediate policy adjustment but highly serially correlated shocks.” In the former rule 
persistent deviations from an output and inflation response occur because policymakers are 
slow to react, while in the latter rule, these deviations reflect the policymaker’s response to 
other persistent influences. Rudebusch (2002b) distinguishes between the two type of rules by 
analyzing the term structure. 
8. A similar illusionary effect, but caused by horizon misspecification, is documented 
by Orphanides (2001). “Estimation of a policy reaction with a mis-specified horizon can yield 
extremely misleading information regarding the responsiveness of policy to the inflation and 
real economic activity outlook.” He shows that the policy reaction function which has forward 
looking behavior, but includes forecasts of less than four quarters ahead, has higher estimates 
for the lag of federal funds rate and output gap and lower for inflation, compared to a the 
specification with forecasts of four quarter ahead. One could mistake the presence of smoothing 
behavior, with the process described above. Intuitively, this is explained by the fact that the lag 
of federal funds rate and output gap become increasingly more informative for predicting 
inflation four quarters ahead, relative to the contribution of inflation, for the same forecast of 
inflation four quarters ahead.    - 20 - 
Note that mechanics for these two illusionary effects are different: Rudebusch’s or what 
we would like to call “a high persistence effect” arises due to high serial correlation of the 
variables involved: Taylor rule sets the interest rate as a function of output gap and inflation, 
which, being highly persistent are similar in values to their lagged values, which proxy a lagged 
interest rate. 
Orphanides’ or what we would like to call “a reduced form effect” arises due to horizon 
misspecification and does not necessarily require ex ante high serial correlation of the 
variables. It appears because expected inflation can be expressed in terms of lagged interest rate 
and expected inflation at a shorter horizon, thus it involves substitution of expected inflation 
with a formula involving lagged interest rate. 
The empirical part of our paper examines this and other illusionary effects in a 
mathematical way, via Monte-Carlo simulations. We show how easy it is to confuse a very 
particular setting with something, which theoretically is very different, even though empirically 
the two would be very close. Our simulations demonstrate a big degree of statistical illusion, 
caused by serial correlation of the variables, and yielding an impression of rather sophisticated 
monetary policy, more sophisticated than it actually is assumed to be. 
Before we proceed, as an illustration, on how different these estimated simple rules can 
be, even when the sample is more or elss the same, we put together the following table, which 
presents several versions of the Taylor rule proposed by economists for the period of late 80s 
and early 90s in the US. 
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Table 1. Short list of proposed rules for the US data 
Paper Rule 
1. Taylor (1993)  1.00 1.50 0.50 tt t iy π =+ +  
2. Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000) 
11 1 0.79 0.21( * 4.12 2.15 0.93 ) tt t t t t ii r E E y π − ++ =+− + +  
3. Orphanides (2001) 
14 4 0.62 0.38(3.22 1.29 1.00 ) tt t t t t ii E E y π −+ + =+ + +   
4. Ball and Tchaidze (2002)  1.47 1.54 1.67( *) tt t t iu u π =+ + − 
5. Orphanides and Williams (2002) 
1 1 0.72 0.28( * 1.26 1.83( *) 2.39( )) tt t t t t ii r u u u u π − − =+ + −− −−  
 
They are all very different, yet suggested for the same economic structure. 
Rule 1 is the very original one, proposed by Taylor (1993). 
Rule 2, estimated using GMM, incorporates both a smoothing component and a forward 
looking (1 quarter ahead) behavior, responding to expected values. 
Rule 3 is similar to rule 2, but is based on real-time data and explicit expected values of 
4 quarters ahead, the so-called “Greenbook” forecasts, prepared by the Fed economists before 
the meetings of the Federal Open Market Committee. 
Rule 4 is estimated assuming policy maker responding to inflation and unemployment 
gap with real time estimates of a time-varying NAIRU.  
Finally, rule 5, suggested by Orphanides and Williams, assumes policy makers 
responding both to unemployment gap and changes in unemployment.  
While from prescriptive point of view it does not really matter if several different 
formulas yield approximately the same numerical result, it does matter from the 
methodological point of view, and one should not jump to quick conclusions about the nature 
of the policy. 
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3. Estimation of Rules Based on Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) Model 
The Model 
The model we use for our simulations in this section is described in Rudebusch and 
Svensson (1999). The model consists of two equations, a Phillips curve, where a quarterly 
inflation is determined by its four lags and an output gap lag; and an IS curve, where quarterly 
output gap is determined by its own two lags and an annual real interest rate.
20 Here we used 
Rudebusch (2000) version of the model:
21 
822 . 0 ; 007 . 1
) ( 09 . 0 27 . 0 17 . 1 19 . 0
15 . 0 12 . 0 29 . 0 08 . 0 67 . 0 08 . 0
2 1
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= =
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− −
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where top bar denotes the annual variable (average of quarterly data). 
This model is completely backward-looking, implicitly assuming adaptive expectations 
and has become somewhat a standard tool in policy analysis (see Romer, 2002). The literature 
suggests that alternative forward-looking frameworks do not fit the observed data well unless 
there are some agents that are to some degree backward-looking (e.g. Ball, 2000, Roberts, 1997 
and 1998).  
The model assumes that policy makers can affect inflation only within two periods, as 
monetary policy has an effect on output gap with a one period lag, and output gap likewise 
affects inflation with a one period lag. 
                                                 
20 All quarterly variables are annualized. 
21 Rudebusch and Svensson (1999)has variables de-meaned prior to estimation, so no constants 
appear in equations, while Rudebusch (2000) is not.    - 23 - 
The lagged inflation coefficients in the Phillip’s curve are restricted so that their sum is 
equal to 1. However, the results are very similar even without imposing this restriction. 
Finally, note that the model implies an equilibrium real interest rate of 2.11 percent. 
To close the model, we assume that the policy maker sets the quarterly interest rate 
according to a Taylor rule as follows: 
1 1 1 1 5 . 0 5 . 1 11 . 1 ) 1 ( *) * ( − − − − + + = + + + − = t y t t y t t y y C C C r i π π π π π    (1) 
As you can see, the rule is very similar to the one proposed in Taylor (1993). It differs 
in two instances. First, the constant is slightly higher, as the equilibrium real interest rate 
implied by the model is higher than 2 percent assumed by Taylor. Second, the interest rate 
responds to the quarterly lags on the fundamentals, rather than their contemporaneous values, 
as those reflect the latest information, which policy makers can actually observe (McCallum, 
19997). Inflation target is assumed to be 2 percent, similar to Taylor (1993). 
This rule can be characterized as “naïve to the fourth degree.” First, the monetary policy 
setting is explained by only two fundamentals – output gap and inflation. Second, the monetary 
policy setting is backward, with a short term interest rate reacting only to the latest observed 
values of the fundamentals. Third, the rule assumes that a policy maker ignores possible data 
measurement errors. And finally, the rule is completely mechanical, with no judgmental 
element being present. 
 
Simulations 
Before simulations begin, two normally distributed random series are generated, which 
correspond to output gap and inflation shocks.     - 24 - 
It is assumed that for the first four periods the economy is in the steady state with output 
gap at 0, inflation at 2 percent, and the interest rate at 4.11 percent (2 percent plus equilibrium 
real interest rate). 
Overall, 1000 periods are simulated and the last 970 are used for estimations. 
Simulations and regressions are being run 500 times and averages of the estimated coefficients, 
standard errors, adjusted R squared, Durbin-Watson statistics and Sum of Squared Residuals 
are reported in the outcome tables. 
We use obtained data in order to see if our estimations would allow us to identify the 
policy rule as it is or if they document an illusionary presence of more sophisticated versions of 
the Taylor rule – ones which are forecast based, have an embedded interest rate smoothing, or 
respond to growth rates of the fundamentals. 
 
Estimations 
We estimate the rules using first lags, contemporaneous fundamentals, and leads of 
second and fourth order, using a simple functional form and with additional variables, such as 
lagged interest rate, output gap growth, and inflation differential. 
When evaluating the rules with correctly specified timing of the fundamentals, both 
OLS and GMM methods correctly identify the coefficients of the rule, assigning 0 values to 
every additional variable, such as lagged interest rate, inflation differential, and output gap 
growth. We obtain adjusted R-squared of 1.0 and sum of squared residuals of 0.0. Durbin-
Watson statistics is 2.0. 
However, when the rules with incorrectly specified timing of the fundamentals are 
evaluated, both methods produce incorrect assessment.     - 25 - 
Table 2 shows results of estimating a rule with a simple functional form, when the true 
rule is based on lags:
 22 
1 1 ) 1 ( − + − + + + + = t k t y t k t t y E C E C C i π π  
Table 2. Simple functional form, true rule based on lag values 
  HRZN k  PI  Y  CNST SSR  Adj R2  DW 
OLS -1 1.50  0.50  1.11  0.0  1.00  2.01 
OLS 0 1.48  0.35  1.09  384.0  0.98  1.22 
OLS 2 1.41  0.02  1.20  1512.4 0.94  0.38 
OLS 4 1.32  -0.26  1.39  2489.0 0.90  0.26 
GMM -1  1.50  0.50  1.11  0.0 1.00  2.01 
GMM 0  1.50  0.41  1.06  400.7  0.98  1.24 
GMM 2  1.50  0.17  0.94  1672.8 0.93  0.38 
GMM 4  1.50  -0.14  0.78  2847.5 0.88  0.24 
 
All the rules produce rather high adjusted R-squared, even though the SSR and DW 
sharply deteriorate as the horizon of the variables increases. Note however, that inflation 
coefficient does not change at all remaining at 1.5, while output gap coefficient declines as the 
horizon rises. 
This could be mistakenly interpreted as, for example, a one year ahead looking policy, 
where policy maker eyes inflation, but ignores movements in the expected output gap (output 
gap coefficient is statistically insignificant), but takes into account other events (collected in a 
judgmental policy shock ζ), an interpretation which does not strike as very unreasonable: 
2
44 (0.04) (0.07) (0.17)
1.50 0.14 0.78 ; 0.88 tt t t t t iE E y R πζ ++ =−+ + =  
                                                 
22 Results in table 2 should be read as such. For the rule with one lag, this correspond to the row 
under horizon k, and the average of each coefficient and main statistics are reported in that line. 
The rows in bold in the table reflect that the rule used to simulate the data had that particular 
form, interest rate was determined by inflation and output gap lag.     - 26 - 
Next we estimate a rule where policy maker smoothes the path for the interest rate, 
having in mind interest rate target as prescribed by the “original” Taylor rule, but constraining 
him/herself with avoiding big jumps in the value of the instrument: 
) ) 1 ( )( 1 ( 1 1 1 − + − + − + + + − + = t k t y t k t i t i t y E C E C C C i C i π π  
Table 3. Smoothing functional form, true rule based on lag values 
  HRZN k  FFR(-1)  PI  Y  CNST SSR  Adj R2  DW 
OLS -1  0.00  1.50  0.50  1.11  0.0  1.00  2.01 
OLS 0  0.51  1.51  0.53  1.06  134.8  0.99  2.66 
OLS 2  0.77  1.52  0.52  0.87  276.4  0.99  1.56 
OLS 4  0.85  1.57  0.35  0.76  357.6  0.99  1.35 
GMM -1  0.00 1.50  0.50  1.11  0.0 1.00  2.01 
GMM 0  0.40  1.53  0.53  1.03  156.9  0.99  2.36 
GMM 2  0.58  1.60  0.57  0.76  466.7  0.98  0.92 
GMM 4  0.51  1.64  0.32  0.52  1038.5 0.96  0.47 
 
When timing of the fundamentals is specified correctly, the rule is identified precisely. 
However, once the forecasts are used, there is an illusion of significant smoothing, i.e. lagged 
interest rate being present. Again, the value of the inflation coefficient still looks very 
reasonable, and even increases, while output gap coefficient declines, albeit staying positive. 
Thus, a not very careful researcher may claim the following policy setting: 
2
14 4 (0.04) (0.05) (0.13) (0.20)
0.51 0.49(1.64 0.32 0.52) ; 0.96 tt t t t t t ii E E y R πζ −+ + =+ + + + =  
Such a setting fits perfectly with our understanding of the monetary policy—it is 
forward looking, sufficiently active in responding to inflation and output gap, moving 
instrument variable cautiously, and having a judgmental element in it. Good fit would allow to 
produce nice charts and reasonable historical evidence.    - 27 - 
In the economic literature, the coefficient on the lagged interest rates is usually 
estimated to be surprisingly high, around 0.7–0.8 (see Rudebusch, 2000) and quite a few papers 
have been written trying to explain this over-cautiousness of the central bankers. Our results 
suggest that such carefulness could be just a statistical illusion, and in some cases it could be 
caused by mis-specification of the rule, in particular by incorrectly specifying timing of the 
fundamentals. 
In addition, we can suggest several other rules, which fit data as well as any of the 
already described ones. Similar to table 1, we compile a list of rules which describe the same 
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The three new, added rules also produce good fit, have constants as well as inflation and 
output gap coefficients very close to the true values, but assume policy maker following closely 
not only values but also growth of fundamentals. 
Note that illusionary presence of the response to growth rates of the fundamentals is 
documented even if the horizon is specified correctly (fourth and fifth equations). 
Also note that no matter what the functional form or horizon is, all of the alternative 
specifications produce a very good fit, and inflation coefficients close to the original value,    - 28 - 
remaining within the 1.3–1.6 range. The output gap coefficients changes, falling as the horizon 
increases and even becoming negative; while the constant term varies but stays above 0.60.  
In addition, we estimate the rule for a shorter time horizon (last 50 observations) to see 
how different results would be; and simulate the economy with policy maker making real time 
data measurement errors. Rudebusch (2000) estimates such real-time data errors and reports 
inflation measurement error to have a standard error of 0.34, while output gap measurement 
error to have a bigger standard error of 0.94. 
In this case, the policy rule would look as follows: 
94 . 0 ; 34 . 0
) 5 . 0 5 . 1 ( 5 . 0 5 . 1 11 . 1 ) ( 5 . 0 ) ( 5 . 1 11 . 1 1 1 1 1
= =
+ + + = + + + + = − − − −
z u




The results are rather straightforward. Neither of these two factors has a significant 
impact on the outcome. One impact of a presence of the real time error is the dispersal across 
500 simulations sharply increases, though remaining very small in absolute terms. 
 
4. Conclusion 
The aim of this paper is twofold. First, we document the history of Taylor rules (in 
closed economies) in the current literature, and second, we illustrate illusionary effects that 
may emerge when estimating them. 
We describe uses (descriptive and prescriptive) and, more importantly, potential abuses 
of Taylor rules. The latter emerge when Taylor rules (and in general simple policy rules) are 
being used as a guide for policy makers, and not enough attention is paid to the fact that the 
rules are likely to be not optimal, mis-specified, or incorrectly estimated.     - 29 - 
When it comes to policy descriptions, consensus has not been reached on the details of 
the specification for the US data, although most analysts and policymakers agree on the 
fundamental features of a monetary policy rule (Kozicki, 1999). Given the lack of consensus in 
the descriptive papers, one would suggest caution for the prescriptive uses of a Taylor rule, for 
any country.  
Moreover, when it comes to prescriptive papers, the conclusions that have been reached 
in the literature suggest that simple rules should not be followed mechanically (Taylor 1993, 
2000), but rather used as “guidelines,” exercising judgment.  
Policymakers embraced this conclusion. Greenspan emphasized in his most recent 
speech, at the AEA meetings, in January 2004, “And the prescriptions of formal rules can, in 
fact, serve as helpful adjuncts to policy, as many of the proponents of these rules have 
suggested. But at crucial points, like those in our recent policy history—the stock market crash 
of 1987, the crises of 1997-1998, and the events that followed September 2001—simple rules 
will be inadequate as either descriptions or prescriptions for policy. [...] On the other hand, no 
simple rule could possible describe the policy action to be taken in every contingency and thus 
provide a satisfactory substitute for an approach based on the principles of risk management.”  
We simulate a simple, completely backward looking model, with a lag based monetary 
policy rule, and we use the obtained data to estimate the monetary policy rule. The estimation 
results indicate several type of rules, suggested in the literature, including forward looking 
monetary policy, smoothing interest rates, etc.  
The results demonstrate that there is a big degree of statistical illusion, caused by serial 
correlation of the variables, and yielding an impression of rather sophisticated monetary policy,    - 30 - 
more sophisticated than it actually is assumed to be – one which is forward looking and takes 
into account additional factors.
23 
The results of this paper also suggest that there could be “too big” conclusions drawn 
based on “too little” evidence. As monetary policy rules are widely used these days to gauge 
policy makers, improper recommendations made on their basis could be harmful. Thus, it 
becomes very important to ensure the awareness of the drawbacks and imprecision of such 
rules. While it is fine that different policy rules are used to describe the same process 
empirically, one should be very careful when making statements about the nature of the policy 
making process, and therefore policy advice should be dispensed with caution. 
The paper does not represent a criticism to the simple policy rules literature, but draws 
attention to inconsistencies in estimating them, and more importantly, to how one could best 
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